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Nev. Recycling & Salvage v. Reno Disposal, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 55 (Aug. 2, 2018) (en banc)1 
 
CIVIL APPEAL: ANTITRUST 
 
Summary 
 
The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
respondents, holding that appellants lacked standing to bring an antitrust claim 
because they were unable to show that they suffered any injuries. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Appellants Nevada Recycling and Salvage, Ltd. (Nevada Recycling) and 
AMCB, LLC, d/b/a Rubbish Runners (Rubbish Runners), brought this suit in district 
court under the Nevada Unfair Trade Practice Act (UTPA). Nevada Recycling 
operates a facility that accepts, processes, recycles, and disposes of waste and 
recyclable materials. Rubbish Runners collects, hauls, and disposes of waste and 
recyclables. Their complaint alleged that respondents, Reno Disposal Company, Inc. 
(Reno Disposal), Refuse, Inc. (Refuse), and Waste Management of Nevada, Inc. 
(Waste Management), also collectors, haulers, and disposers of waste and 
recyclables, entered into a conspiracy with nonparty Castaway Trash Hauling 
(Castaway) for the explicit purpose of monopolizing the waste and recyclables 
market in the City of Reno. 
 
The City of Reno sought to implement a single-stream recycling service and, 
at the suggestion of Reno Disposal, planned to create exclusive service areas 
whereby waste haulers would have an exclusive privilege to collect and dispose of 
waste and recyclable materials within an assigned area. Reno Disposal and Castaway 
were to each receive exclusive commercial franchise agreements, servicing all of 
Reno. Proposed ordinances representing the agreements were discussed at public 
hearings. Rubbish Runners spoke in opposition, concerned that the ordinances would 
put it out of business. In response, carve-outs and exemptions were included in the 
ordinances that allowed Rubbish Runners to keep its existing customers upon 
verification of its customers' contracts. The ordinances were subsequently approved. 
 
Afterwards, Waste Management purchased Castaway and acquired all of 
Castaway's rights and duties held under the ordinance. Waste Management then 
assigned its   rights and duties to Reno Disposal. As a result, Reno Disposal had 
exclusive rights to collect waste and recyclables in the City of Reno, subject to the 
exemptions made for Rubbish Runners. 
Before the district court, appellants argued that respondents conspired to 
create an illegal monopoly for Reno Disposal. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of respondents, concluding that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
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applied because respondents' conduct involved political and not business conduct.2  
In addition, the district court concluded  that,  in  terms  of  damages, appellants 
lacked standing to assert an UTPA claim because they were not qualified to  service 
a franchise  zone, they never sought  to be considered  for a franchise zone, and the 
City of Reno determined that  they  were  not qualified waste haulers.   
 
Discussion 
 
"Antitrust standing is a question of law reviewed de novo."3 Likewise, a 
district court's order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo.4 Summary 
judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.5 All evidence must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.6 General allegations and conclusory statements do 
not create genuine issues of fact.7  
 
Although the Court has not previously addressed standing under the UTPA, 
the United States Supreme Court has addressed standing under the federal antitrust 
counterpart, the Clayton Act,8 and rejected a broad interpretation of the statute.9 
Instead, antitrust standing requires courts to "evaluate the plaintiffs harm, the alleged 
wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship between them."10 Since it is 
“virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in 
every case,"11 certain factors are used to determine antitrust standing: 
 
(1) the nature of the plaintiffs alleged injury; that is, whether it was the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to forestall; 
 
(2) the directness of the injury; 
 
(3) the speculative measure of the harm; 
 
(4) the risk of duplicative recovery; and 
 
(5) the complexity in apportioning damages.12 
 
                                               
2 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
3 Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co. Cal., 190 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). 
4 Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). 
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1030-31. 
8 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 521 
(1983). 
9 Id. at 529 
10 Id. at 535. 
11 Id. at 536. 
12 Am. Ad Mgmt., 190 F.3d at 1054. 
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"Generally no single factor is decisive," and "a court need not find in favor of the 
plaintiff on each factor."13 Instead, the factors should be weighed and balanced.14 
 
The UTPA was intended to preserve competition for the benefit of 
consumers.15 Since Nevada Recycling does not collect waste and recyclable 
materials, it is not a competitor as to the franchise agreements and did not provide 
any evidence showing the ordinances harmed its business. Even if it did, Nevada 
Recycling, as a non-competitor, could not show how any alleged injury is the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to forestall. 
 
Rubbish Runners is a competitor, as its services include the collection of 
waste and recyclable materials, but did not provide any evidence supporting its 
contention that it lost customers due to the franchise agreements. Pursuant to the 
franchise agreements, Rubbish Runners was allowed to keep its existing customers 
upon verification of the customers' contracts.  
 
Because appellants did not make any showing that they suffered any injuries 
(i.e., damages), they lacked antitrust standing. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the 
district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of respondents. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Because appellants did not make any showing that they suffered any injuries 
from respondents' alleged conspiracy, they lacked antitrust standing under the 
UTPA. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of respondents. 
 
                                               
13 Id. at 1055 
14 Id.  
15 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.030 (2017); see also GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 
758 (2d Cir. 1972). 
